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ABSTRACT 
The paper updates the answer to the question: what precisely is the exchange rate regime that China 
has put into place since 2005, when it announced a move away from the dollar peg?  Is it a basket 
anchor with the possibility of cumulatable daily appreciations, as was announced at the time?  We 
apply to this question a new approach to estimating countries' de facto exchange rate regimes, a synthesis 
of two techniques.  One is a technique that has been used in the past to estimate implicit de facto currency 
weights when the hypothesis is a basket peg with little flexibility.  The second is a technique used 
to estimate the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility when the hypothesis is an anchor to the 
dollar or some other single major currency.  Since the RMB and many other currencies today purportedly 
follow variants of Band-Basket-Crawl, it is important to have available a technique that can cover 
both dimensions, inferring weights and inferring flexibility.  The synthesis adds a variable representing 
"exchange market pressure" to the currency basket equation, whereby the degree of flexibility is estimated 
at the same time as the currency weights.  This approach reveals that by mid-2007, the RMB basket 
had switched a substantial part of the dollar's weight onto the euro.  The implication is that the appreciation 
of the RMB against the dollar during this period was due to the appreciation of the euro against the 
dollar, not to any upward trend in the RMB relative to its basket. 
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In 2005, Chinese authorities announced a switch to a new exchange rate regime.  The 
exchange rate would henceforth be set with reference to a basket of other currencies, with 
numerical weights unannounced, allowing a movement of up to+/- .3% within any given day.  
Although this step was originally accepted at face value in public policy circles, early 
statistical tests confirmed that skepticism was in order.  The tests found that the basket 
assigned overwhelming weight to the dollar, and that the degree of flexibility had hardly 
increased at all.  This paper conducts an updated evaluation of what exchange rate regime 
China has actually been following.  The update consists of more than merely adding another  
year or two of data, as important as that is to the result.   
The earlier RMB studies used a technique originally introduced by Frankel and Wei 
(1994) to estimate the weights in a currency basket.  One regressed changes in the value of 
the local currency, in this case the RMB, against changes in the values of the dollar, euro, 
yen, and other currencies that may be in the basket. The equation is correctly specified to 
infer the weights in the case of a perfect basket peg, with an R
2 of 1, but is on less firm 
ground if the authorities allow even a relatively small band of flexibility around the central 
parity.  This approach neglects to include anything to help make sense out of the error term 
under the alternative hypothesis that the country is not perfectly pegged to a major currency 
or to a basket, but rather has adopted a degree of flexibility around the anchor. 
Meanwhile another branch of the regime classification literature is designed to 
uncover the true degree of flexibility of an exchange rate regime.  It has the drawback that it 
is unable to infer what is the relevant anchor.  This paper applies a new synthesis technique, 











suitable for use in inferring the de facto regime for the RMB across the spectrum of 
flexibility and across the array of possible anchors. 
1. The new regime
 The Chinese currency had been effectively pegged to the US dollar at the rate of 8.28 
RMB/dollar from 1997 until July 21, 2005.
1  On that date, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC) proclaimed—after a minor initial revaluation of 2.1%—a switch to a managing float 
regime “with reference to a basket of currencies.”  The announcement was billed as a major 
regime change.   
As is often the case with currency baskets, the Chinese weights were not made public. 
Speculation ensued after the announcement about which currencies were in the new reference 
basket and what their weights were.  On August 9, 2005, PBoC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan 
(2005) disclosed a list of 11 currencies as constituents of the reference basket, in a speech in 
Shanghai marking the opening of the central bank’s second headquarters.  He revealed that 
the major currencies in the basket are the US dollar, the euro, the yen, and the Korean won.  
In light of this statement and in light of the earlier results in Frankel and Wei (2007), we will 
concentrate on these four currencies.
2  The governor said that these currencies were chosen 
1 Incidentally, however, China’s official policy has never been a pegged exchange rate.  This just 
goes to show the common divergence between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes and the 
importance of inferring the true regime from observed data, a point that is by now well understood. 
2 In addition, Governor Zhou stated that the other seven currencies in the basket are the Singapore 
dollar, the British pound, the Malaysian ringgit, the Russian ruble, the Australian dollar, the Thai 
baht, and the Canadian dollar.  Frankel and Wei (2007) found no significant role for these currencies, 
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because of their economies’ importance for China’s current account. Still not announced 
were the weights on these currencies, or the frequency and the criteria with which these 
weights might be altered. 
The newly announced regime would allow a movement of up to  +/- .3% in bilateral 
exchange rates within any given day (later widened to +/- .5%).  In theory this daily band 
could cumulate to an upward trend as high as 6.4% per month.  This would require, however, 
both that movement among the major currencies is low and that the Chinese authorities make 
maximum use of the 0.3% band.  In practice, the cumulative trend has been only a small 
fraction of the hypothetical maximum.  The trend has been dwarfed by movements in the 
dollar against the euro, yen, and other currencies. 
Although the announced change in official policy was originally taken at face value 
in public policy circles, it soon because clear that, at least for the remainder of 2005, the 
currency remained closely linked to the dollar.  Subsequently, in 2006, the RMB indeed 
started to give a little weight to some non-dollar currencies, but the process was very slow.  
In 2007 the RMB appreciated more against the dollar.  This much is known.  But public 
commentary usually fails to distinguish whether the appreciation was attributable to a shift in 
basket weights away from the dollar toward non-dollar currencies, or to a greater degree of 
exchange rate flexibility, or to a trend appreciation.  In our econometric analysis of precisely 
during most of the subsequent two years, with the partial exception of the ringgit.  In this paper we do 
not bother to test for these currencies.  We are very short of data points here, because the new 
synthesis technique requires the use of data on reserves and the monetary base with for China, as for 





what exchange rate regime China has followed since July 2005, we take account of the 
likelihood that the regime has evolved over the three years.   
2. The old technique 
How does one ascertain what is the true exchange rate regime, if a country announces 
the adoption of a basket peg, and reveals a list of currencies that may be included in the 
basket, but does not reveal the exact weighting of the component currencies?  Frankel (1993), 
Frankel and Wei (1994, 1995), Bénassy-Quéré (1999), Ohno (1999), Frankel, Schmukler and 
Servén (2000), and Bénassy-Quéré, Coeuré, and Mignon (2004)  have used a particular 
technique to estimate the implicit weights.  The weight-inference technique is very simple:  
one regresses changes in the value of the local currency, in this case the RMB, against 
changes in the values of the dollar, euro, yen, and other currencies that are candidate 
constituents of the basket.  In the special case where China in fact follows a perfect basket 
peg, the technique is an exceptionally apt application of OLS regression.  It should be easy to 
recover precise estimates of the weights.  The fit should be perfect, an extreme rarity in 
econometrics:  the standard error of the regression should be zero, and R
2 = 100%. 
The reason to work in terms of changes rather than levels is the likelihood of non­
stationarity.  Concern for nonstationarity goes beyond the common refrain of modern time 
series econometrics, the inability to reject statistically a unit root, which in many cases can be 
attributed to insufficient power.  One of the most important hypotheses we are testing is that 
the authorities have allowed the Yuan to drift away from a basket, perhaps via an upward 
trend.  Thus it is important to allow for nonstationarity. Working in terms of first differences 
is the cleanest way to do so.  We should include a constant term to allow for the likelihood of 






                                                 
 
   
 
   
 
Algebraically, if the RMB is pegged to currencies X1, X2, … and Xn, with weights equal to 
w1, w2, … and wn, then 
logRMB(t+s)-logRMB(t) =c+ ∑ w(j) [logX(j, t+s) - logX(j, t)]     ( 1 ) 
One methodological question must be addressed.  How do we define the “value” of 
each of the currencies?  This is the question of the numeraire.
 3  If the exchange rate is truly a 
basket peg, the choice of numeraire currency is immaterial; we estimate the weights 
accurately regardless.
4  If the true regime is more variable than a rigid basket peg, then the 
choice of numeraire does make some difference to the estimation.  Some authors in the past 
have used a remote currency, such as the Swiss franc.   
A weighted index such as a trade-weighted measure or the SDR (Special Drawing 
Right, an IMF unit composed of a basket of most important major currencies) is probably 
3  Frankel (1993) used purchasing power over a consumer basket of domestic goods as numeraire; 
Frankel and Wei (1995) used the SDR; Frankel and Wei (1994, 2006), Ohno (1999), and Eichengreen 
(2006) used the Swiss franc; Bénassy-Quéré (1999), the dollar; Frankel, Schmukler and Luis Servén 
(2000), a GDP-weighted basket of five major currencies; and Yamazaki (2006), the Canadian dollar.  
Bénassy-Quéré, Coeuré, and Mignon (2004) propose a modification of the methodology, with a 
method of moments approach;  the advantage of the modification is that it does not depend on the 
choice of a numeraire currency. 
4 If the linear equation holds precisely in terms of any one “correct” numeraire, then add the log 
exchange rate between that numeraire and any arbitrary unit to see that the equation also holds 
precisely in terms of the arbitrary numeraire.  This assumes the weights add to 1, and there is no error 





                                                 
 
more appropriate.  Here is why.  Assume the true regime is a target zone or a managed float 
centered around a reference basket, where the authorities intervene to an extent that depends 
on the magnitude of the deviation;  this seems the logical alternative hypothesis in which a 
strict basket peg is nested.  The error term in the equation represents shocks in demand for 
the currency that the authorities allow to be partially reflected in the exchange rate (but only 
partially, because they intervene if the shocks are large).  Then one should use a numeraire 
that is similar to the yardstick used by the authorities in measuring what constitutes a large 
deviation.  The authorities are unlikely to use the Swiss franc or Canadian dollar in thinking 
about the size of deviations from their reference point.  They are more likely to use a 
weighted average of major currencies.  If we use a similar measure in the equation, it should 
help minimize the possibility of correlation between the error term and the numeraire. 
Similarly, if there is a trend in the exchange rate equation (a constant term in the changes 
equation) representing deliberate gradual appreciation of the currency, then the value of the 
RMB should be defined in terms of whatever weighted exchange rate index the authorities 
are likely to use in thinking about the trend.  These considerations suggest a numeraire that is 
itself composed of a basket of currencies.  Here, as in Frankel and Wei (2007), we choose the 
SDR.
5 
There is a good argument for constraining the weights on the currencies to add up to 
1.  The easiest way to implement the adding up constraint is to run the regressions with the 
changes in the log RMB value on the left-hand side of the equation transformed by 
subtracting off the changes in the log value of one of the currencies, say the won, and the 
5 Among the extensions and robustness checks in that paper was a check whether the results were 
sensitive to the numeraire, as between the SDR and gold. 
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changes in the values of the non-won currencies on the right-hand side transformed in the 
same way.   
To see this, we repeat equation (1): 
Δ log RMBt  = c +  ∑ w(j) [Δ logX(j)t ] 
= c + β(1) Δ log $ t + β(2) Δ log ¥t + β(3) Δ log €t  + α Δ log wont 
We want to impose the adding up constraint α = 1 - β(1) - β(2) - β(3) … 
We implement it by running the regression equation (2): 
[Δ log RMB t - Δ log wont ]  = c  +  β(1) [Δ log $t - Δ log wont ]
 +  β(2)[ Δ log ¥t  - Δ log wont]  +  β(3) )[Δ log €t -Δ log wont]  (2) 
One can recover the implicit weight on the value of the won by adding the estimated 
weights on the non-dollar currencies, and subtracting the sum from 1.  (This coefficient 
estimate is reported in the last row of the tables.)  Imposing the constraint sharpens the 
estimates a bit.
6 
3. The old results 
Shah, Zeileis, and Patnaik (2005) adopted the weight-inference methodology to study 
the Chinese currency basket after July 2005 and found that the RMB was still tightly pegged 
to the dollar, and no other currencies.  However, the only candidate currencies that they 
considered in the RMB basket were the dollar, the yen, the euro, and the pound, probably 
unaware of the eleven-currency disclosure made by the Chinese central bank (with the won 
on the A-list).  In addition, their sample covered only the initial few months after July 21, 
6 The choice of which currency to drop from the righthand side in order to impose the adding up 
constraint, in this case the won, is completely immaterial to the estimates.  The choice of which 
currency to use as numeraire, by contrast, is material to the estimates (to the extent that the true 
regime differs substantially from a perfect basket peg). 
9  
 
2005.  Frankel and Wei (2006) extended to 11 the components of the basket, but found that 
the RMB regime in the second half of 2005 was still a tight dollar peg – as tight as that of the 
Hong Kong SAR regime.  Ogawa (2006) found the same.  Eichengreen (2006, p. 22-25) had 
daily observations of data that ran from July 22, 2005, to March 21, 2006, and found a dollar 
weight around .9, but with no evidence of a downward trend in the weight, and no 
significance on non-dollar currencies. 
Each of these four papers was too early to catch the evolution in 2006. Yamazaki  
(2006, p.8) updated the estimation, and found some weight had shifted to the euro, yen and 
won; but he estimated the equation in terms of levels rather than changes (risking non­
stationarity), did not allow for a trend, did not allow for the other currencies on the list, and 
had a relatively small number of (bimonthly) observations.   
Frankel and Wei (2007) found continued evolution of the Chinese exchange rate 
regime over the two-year period from July 2005 to August 2007.  In the first six months 
following the announced shift by the Chinese central bank to a managed floating regime with 
reference to a basket of eleven currencies, China gave such heavy weight to the US dollar 
that it was indistinguishable from a dollar pegger.  However, after February 2006, there were 
signs of increased flexibility. First, in the spring of 2006, some weight in the basket was 
temporarily shifted to other currencies: the Malaysian ringgit, the Korean won, the Russian 
ruble, and the Thai baht.  Surprisingly, throughout the sample, there was not an iota of 
evidence of any positive weight assigned to the yen or the euro.  Second, beginning in the fall 
of 2006, in addition to the lesser weight on the dollar (an estimated weight of 0.9 rather than 






                                                 
   
basket became slightly looser.  There was a non-negligible trend of appreciation against the 
basket. 
4. Updated results with daily data, using the traditional technique 
Table 1 here updates through October 2008 the estimation of the RMB basket using 
the traditional approach, on daily exchange rate data.  We take advantage of the abundance 
of daily data to estimate the parameters in a rolling regression by 3-month sub-periods, 
thereby allowing  the regime to evolve rapidly over time.  (Table A1 in the appendix to the 
working paper estimates the parameters month by month, allowing for even more rapid 
evolution.)  As in earlier studies, the weight on the dollar remains close to 1.0 throughout 
2005 and 2006.
7  In some periods thereafter the dollar weight falls significantly below 1.0, in 
the range 0.8-0.9 from mid 2007 through early 2008.  In some of these months the R
2 does 
fall as low as .85 showing a (rather limited) degree of flexibility around the anchor.  
Flexibility also shows up in the form of a positive trend in the value of the RMB which, 
though very slight, is statistically significant in many months.  In many of the estimation 
intervals, the Korean won or Japanese yen seem to be the currencies that make up the non­
dollar share (particularly January-May, 2006, and September 2007-February 2008, 
respectively). 
During the months July-October 2008, which are covered by the last three rolling 
regressions of the sample, the yen and won drop out, and the statistically significant weight 
instead shifts to the euro.  Though the euro’s estimated weight never rises above .07, the R2 
returns to 1.0, suggestive of a basket peg.  
















[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
When we estimate month-by-month, the weight on the dollar more often drops 
statistically below 1.0.  The yen, the won, and the euro are each occasionally significant, 
though none consistently so.
8  When we include the full array of ten currencies in the basket, 
the Malaysian ringgit joins the list of those that are occasionally significant.
9 
5. The new technique 
Although the weight-inference technique is well-specified if the true regime is a tight 
basket peg, as noted, it may be less well specified if the true regime allows flexibility.  For 
any currency it is very likely that in practice the basket peg is not perfect.  If the basket peg is 
relatively tight, one can still expect to estimate the weights with fairly tight standard errors.  
One can also estimate a trend appreciation term with no problem.  But one is also interested 
in estimating whether the authorities allow increased flexibility relative to the weighted 
basket, for example, how wide the band is.  It stands to reason that the looser the link, the 
lower the R
2.  But in the event of substantial flexibility, there is no theorem that says that the 
equation is correctly specified, the weights accurately estimated, or the R
2 an appropriate 
8  Appendix Table A1 of working paper version of this paper, which is Harvard Kennedy School 
RWP08-077.  
9  Appendix Table A2 of working paper version of this paper.  The appendix will also appear in a 
related paper to be published in China’s Emerging Financial Markets: Challenges and Opportunities, 




                                                 
 
 
calibration of the degree of flexibility.  Indeed, one can imagine a fall in the R
2 resulting, 
from an increase in external shocks to economic fundamentals instead of from any further 
loosening of the exchange rate regime.
10 
There are by now many attempts to discern the true “de facto” exchange rate regimes 
that countries actually follow, along the spectrum from fixed to floating, with a continuum of  
flexibility in between.  Among the most prominent are Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Levy-
Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2003, 2005).  Their classification schemes count as a de facto floater 
a country that has high variability of the exchange rate, relative to variability of reserves, and 
count as fixed a country that has low variability of the exchange rate relative to reserves.   
It is important when inferring the de facto flexibility of an exchange rate regime to 
look beyond the variability of the exchange rate in itself.  One currency could show a higher 
degree of variability than another, and yet this might be because the former has been subject 
to larger shocks than the latter, rather than because the authorities intervene less and allow a 
given shock to show up more in the form of price movement.  It is for just such reasons that 
the classification schemes of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003, 2005) do not look at exchange rate variability alone (prices of currencies), but rather 
compare it to variability in reserves or money supplies (quantities of currencies).  The 
question is:  when there is a shock that increases international demand for the RMB, to what 
extent do the authorities allow it to show up as an appreciation, and to what extent as an 
increase in reserves.   
10 One can see from graphs in Frankel and Wei (2008) how commodity producers tend to have higher 





                                                 
 
   
 
 
   
In this paper, we frame the issue in terms of the Exchange Market Pressure variable, 
which is defined as the percentage increase in the value of the currency plus the  increase in 
reserves (expressed as a fraction of the monetary base).
11  When this variable appears on the 
right-hand side of an equation and the percentage increase in the value of the currency 
appears on the left, a coefficient of 0 signifies a completely fixed exchange rate (no changes 
in the value of the currency), a high coefficient signifies a floating rate (few changes in 
reserves). 
One possible limitation of these and other papers that estimate flexibility versus 
stability of exchange rate regimes is that they sometimes have to make arbitrary judgments 
regarding what is the major currency in terms of which flexibility and stability are to be 
defined.  The dollar is the most common choice.  This may be fine for most Western 
Hemisphere countries.  But for many others, particularly in Asia and the Pacific, the relevant 
foreign currency is neither the dollar nor the euro, but some (possibly trade-weighted) basket.  
It would be better to let the data tell us what is the relevant anchor for a given country, 
especially for those that are not clearly in either the dollar or euro camp, rather than making 
the judgment subjectively or a priori.
12 
11 The progenitor of the Exchange Market Pressure variable, in a rather different context, was Girton 
and Roper (1977).  We impose the a priori constraint that a one percentage increase in the foreign 
exchange value of the currency and a one percentage increase in the supply of the currency have 
equal weights in reflecting an increase in demand for the currency (rather than normalizing by 
standard deviations as the Girton-Roper literature sometimes does).  Also, for simplicity, we do not 
include changes in interest rates as a third possible component of exchange market pressure (though 
we did explore this idea in Table 8 of the working paper version of Frankel and Wei, 2008). 










           
 
  
   
 
  
              
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
The new equation that we now apply is a synthesis of the inferred-weights technique 
(Frankel and Wei, 1994, etc.)  and the flexibility criterion (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 
2003, 2005, etc.).  Since the RMB and many other currencies today purportedly follow 
variants of Band-Basket-Crawl, it is important to have available a technique that can cover 
both dimensions, inferring weights and inferring flexibility.
13 
6. New estimation 
Our equation is: 
Δ logRMB t  =  c  +  ∑ w(j) Δ logX(j) t  +  δ { Δ emp t }  +  u t  (3) 
where Δ emp t  denotes the percentage change in exchange market pressure, that is, the 
increase in international demand for the RMB, which may show up either in the price of the 
RMB or the quantity of the RMB depending on the policies of the Chinese monetary 
authorities (floating vs. fixed).  Here we define the percentage change in total exchange 
market pressure by 
Δ emp t  ≡ Δ logRMB t  + ΔRes t /MB t . 
The w(j) coefficients capture the de facto weights on the constituent currencies.  The 
coefficient δ captures the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility: a high δ means the 
currency floats purely, because there is no foreign exchange market intervention (no changes 
in reserves) ; δ =0 means the exchange rate is purely fixed, because it never changes in valu ;  
most currencies probably lie somewhere in between.  
We repeat equation (3), with the major basket currencies made explicit: 
13 Frankel and Wei (2008). 
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Δ logRMB t  =  c  +  ∑ w(j) [Δ logX t]  + δ { Δ emp t } + u t  (3’) 
= c + w(1) Δ log $ t + w (2) Δ log €t + w (3) Δ log ¥t + w (4) Δ log wont + 
+ δ { Δ emp t }  +  u t  . 
We want to impose the adding up constraint w(4) = 1 - w(1) -w(2)- w(3)  - … 
We implement it by running the regression equation (3): 
[ΔlogRMB t – Δlog wont]  =  c  +  w(1) [Δlog $t - Δlog wont] 
+ w(2) [Δlog €t - Δlog wont]  + w(3) [Δlog ¥t  - Δlog wont]  + δ{ΔlogEMP t } +  ut  (4) 
The results reported in Table 2 come from the estimation of this equation.  Here the 
weight on the dollar falls more dramatically in 2007, to 0.6, and the weight on the euro rises 
more dramatically, to a highly significant 0.4.  The significance is impressive in that there are 
so few data points in each of these regressions (only 12 per year).  The coefficient on 
exchange market pressure is statistically significant and in excess of 0.2, in 2005 and again in 
2007.  This indicates a surprising degree of exchange rate flexibility.
14  But the upward trend 
is gone.  In fact the constant term, though not usually significant, is always negative. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
14 For comparison, the coefficient exchange market pressure in the case of the Australian and 
Canadian dollars – two floaters -- only ever gets as high as 0.3 or 0.4  -- Frankel and Wei (2008).  In 
theory, if changes in reserves precisely captured foreign exchange intervention and nothing else, the 
estimated δ should approach 1.0 in the case of pure floaters.  In practice, reserves often change for 






7.  Conclusions regarding the recent Chinese exchange rate regime 
Reporting in the financial press has focused on the 2005-2008 appreciation of the 
RMB against the dollar.  The focus is understandable, both because this is the question of 
political interest, and because looking at a 2005-2008 graph of the dollar/yuan exchange rate 
seems to tell a clean story of an appreciation trend that, though starting out very small, 
gradually escalated in an exponential way.  If this accelerating trend were in fact deemed part 
of the current regime, one could extrapolate it and predict more serious appreciation in the 
future. 
Our results—with the benefit of more recent data and a technique that allows for 
changes in currency weights as well as changes in the rigidity of the peg—suggest that the 
regime probably is not best described as a dollar peg with a trend appreciation.  Rather, the 
regime that has recently been in effect is better described as a basket peg with some weight 
on a non-dollar currency, the euro in particular.  By mid-2007, the weight on the dollar had 
fallen to 0.6 and the weight on the euro had risen correspondingly to 0.4.  The euro now 
apparently plays almost as important a role as the dollar.  It follows that the appreciation of 
the RMB against the dollar in 2007 was attributable to the appreciation of the euro against 
the dollar, not to a trend effective appreciation of the RMB.  The distinction in 
characterizations of the regime could make a big difference for the future.  Our results 
suggest that if the euro in the future reverses its 2005-07 appreciation against the dollar, the 
Chinese currency may automatically do the same thing….unless the regime evolves again 
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Table 1: Updated Estimation of Weights in RMB Basket with Daily Exchange Rate Data 
Evolution of RMB Basket Weights from 6-22-2005, 3-month windows, ending on the month shown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COEFFICIENT 8/2005 9/2005  10/2005  11/2005  12/2005  1/2006 2/2006 3/2006 
usd  0.805*** 0.968*** 0.957*** 0.980*** 0.972*** 0.996*** 0.979*** 0.965*** 
(0.123) (0.017) (0.034) (0.030) (0.028) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) 
eur  -0.146 -0.013 -0.019 -0.004 -0.001  -0.023**  -0.018 -0.015 
(0.100) (0.019) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
jpy  0.315 0.027 0.048 0.019 0.007 0.017  0.026**  0.031** 
(0.200) (0.016) (0.029) (0.028) (0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
Constant  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  63 63 63 63 61 63 61 64 
R-squared  0.84 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 
krw  0.027 0.019 0.015 0.004 0.022 0.010 0.013 0.019 
Evolution of RMB Basket Weights from 2-22-2006, 3-month windows, ending on the month shown 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COEFFICIENT 4/2006 5/2006 6/2006 7/2006 8/2006 9/2006  10/2006  11/2006 
usd  0.947*** 0.932*** 0.929*** 0.895*** 0.905*** 0.895*** 0.939*** 0.965*** 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.033) (0.045) (0.033) (0.028) 
eur  0.003  0.005  0.007 -0.020 -0.031 -0.007 -0.033 0.047 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.032) (0.029) (0.034) (0.031) (0.035) 
jpy  0.008 0.009 0.020  0.051*  0.078***  0.037 0.041 -0.060 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.028) (0.023) (0.031) (0.030) (0.036) 
Constant  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000**  0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  62 63 62 62 62 61 62 63 
R-squared  0.99 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.94 0.96 





          
 
   
       
   
           
   
           
   
 
 




          
 
   
 
   
             
   
         
   
 
 
   
 
Evolution of RMB Basket Weights from 10-22-2006, 3-month windows, ending on the month shown 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COEFFICIENT 12/2006 1/2007 2/2007 3/2007 4/2007 5/2007 6/2007 7/2007 
usd  1.005*** 0.973*** 0.930*** 0.814*** 0.924*** 0.947*** 0.925*** 0.796*** 
(0.038) (0.048) (0.060) (0.035) (0.050) (0.064) (0.074) (0.076) 
eur  0.006 0.010 0.018  0.068**  0.071*  0.003 0.024 0.009 
(0.038) (0.030) (0.034) (0.027) (0.040) (0.041) (0.049) (0.040) 
jpy  -0.023  -0.019 0.007  0.020*  0.019 0.043 0.052 0.028 
(0.035) (0.027) (0.019) (0.011) (0.015) (0.028) (0.045) (0.028) 
Constant  0.000** 0.000**  0.000*  0.000  0.000  0.000** 0.000**  0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  61 63 61 64 61 64 63 64 
R-squared  0.95 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.87 0.85 0.89 
krw  0.011 0.036 0.045 0.098 -0.014 0.007 -0.001 0.167 
Evolution of RMB Basket Weights from 6-22-2007, 3-month windows, ending on the month shown 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COEFFICIENT 8/2007 9/2007  10/2007  11/2007  12/2007  1/2008 2/2008 3/2008 
usd  0.869*** 0.895*** 0.886*** 0.843*** 0.824*** 0.862*** 0.878*** 0.972*** 
(0.060) (0.042) (0.078) (0.061) (0.065) (0.055) (0.041) (0.034) 
eur  0.032 0.004 0.034 0.044 0.054 0.045 0.019 0.003 
(0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.031) (0.040) (0.030) (0.026) (0.023) 
jpy  -0.012 -0.013 -0.002  0.037**  0.035**  0.040**  0.044***  0.026 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) 
Constant  0.000*  0.000  0.000**  0.000**  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  63 62 63 63 62 63 61 64 
R-squared  0.89 0.89 0.87 0.90 0.88 0.85 0.96 0.97 





          
 
   
           
   
         
   
       
   
 
 
       
 
 
Evolution of RMB Basket Weights from 2-22-2008, 3-month  windows, ending on the month shown 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COEFFICIENT 4/2008 5/2008 6/2008 7/2008 8/2008 9/2008  10/2008  11/2008 
usd  0.959*** 0.991*** 0.949*** 0.973*** 0.958*** 0.992*** 0.989*** 0.971*** 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.034) (0.027) (0.026) (0.039) 
Eur  0.015 0.029 -0.012 -0.027 0.035  0.049**  0.052***  0.070** 
(0.034) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.024) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028) 
Jpy  0.026  0.009 0.063* 0.064* -0.005 -0.030 -0.031 -0.022 
(0.022) (0.030) (0.035) (0.033) (0.028) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) 
Constant  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  62 64 63 64 62 60 38 18 
R-squared  0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Krw  0.001 -0.028 -0.000 -0.010 0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.019 
Estimates from OLS, over three month sample periods ending on indicated dates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *(**)[***] 







          
 
   
           
   
 
   
 
             
   
     








Table 2: Rolling 12-month regressions of value of RMB against values of other currencies and Δ EMP 
Δ (EMP) defined as [res(t)-res(t-1)]/mb(t-1) + [exr(t)-exr(t-1)]/exr(t-1) 
12-month windows, ending on the month shown 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COEFFICIENT 06M7 06M8 06M9  06M10  06M11  06M12  07M1 07M2 
usd  0.710*** 0.776*** 0.749*** 0.737*** 0.909*** 0.870*** 0.786*** 0.756*** 
(0.105) (0.132) (0.154) (0.150) (0.147) (0.213) (0.175) (0.105) 
jpy  0.149*  0.090 0.107 0.122 -0.015 0.025 0.014 -0.095 
(0.069) (0.096) (0.103) (0.109) (0.098) (0.140) (0.124) (0.085) 
eur  0.109 0.124 0.120 0.118 0.029 0.034 0.056 0.116 
(0.086) (0.125) (0.127) (0.116) (0.117) (0.131) (0.094) (0.096) 
Δ emp  0.269**  0.215* 0.250* 0.254*  0.137  0.139  0.176  0.179*** 
(0.095) (0.108) (0.114) (0.113) (0.100) (0.157) (0.104) (0.047) 
Constant  -0.005*  -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002  -0.003* 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations  12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
R-squared  0.985 0.975 0.973 0.975 0.984 0.979 0.964 0.967 
krw  0.031 0.010 0.024 0.023 0.077 0.070 0.144 0.222 
Estimates from OLS, over twelve month sample periods ending on indicated dates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *(**)[***] 
indicates significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level. Coefficient on krw is implied by coefficient estimates. 
25